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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CHRISTINE VILLANTI,
X
Plaintiff,
-against-
COLD SPRING HARBOR CENTRAL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, ANDREA CLOUSER 
(sued in her Official and Individual Capacities), 
THOMAS P. DOLAN, (sued in his Official and 
Individual Capacities), JOSEPH MONESTARO 
(sued in his Official and Individual Capacities), 
JAY MATUK (sued in his Official and 
Individual Capacities),
MEMORANDUM OF 
DECISION AND ORDER
08-cv-434 (ADS)(MLO)
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
X
Scott Michael Mishkin, P.C.
Attorneys for the plaintiff 
One Suffolk Square, Suite 240 
Islandia, New York 11749
By: Scott Michael Mishkin, Esq.
Bruce E. Wingate, Esq., of Counsel
Cruser Mitchell & Novitz LLP
Attorneys for the defendants 
175 Pinelawn Road, Suite 301 
Melville, NY 11747
By: Rondiene E. Novitz, Esq.
Keith V. Tola, Esq., of Counsel
SPATT, District Judge.
The plaintiff Christine Villanti, a junior high school science and health teacher, 
filed this suit against her employer and various school administrators, alleging 
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and related New York state
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laws. The defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons 
that follow, the Court grants this motion in part and denies it in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Christine Villanti is forty-four years old, and has taught science and 
health at the Cold Spring Harbor Junior/Senior High School (the “High School”) since 
2001. During the summer break in 2004, Villanti experienced a mild heart attack for 
which she was temporarily hospitalized. Villanti was ultimately diagnosed with an 
ongoing condition called “vasospastic angina,” which the Court understands to mean 
that Villanti experiences chest pains that are related to contractions of the blood vessels 
in her heart. See Stedman’s Medical Dictionary at 80, 1934 (27th ed. 2000). Villanti 
states that her chest pains worsen with stress, changes in the weather, and physical 
exertion, and that her condition has significantly affected her ability to do a number of 
things, including exercise, carry heavy weights, and do stressful activities.
Villanti returned to teaching in the fall of 2004 without missing any work. She 
states that she informed school administrators about her heart attack shortly after it 
happened, and then requested certain accommodations. Although her requests changed 
to some extent over the next three years, Villanti primarily asked that (1) she teach in 
only one classroom, (2) she should teach a limited number of classes each week, (3) she 
should not teach more than two unique classes, and (4) she not teach more than two or 
three consecutive class periods.
According to Villanti, her superiors granted most, if not all, of these 
accommodations for the 2004-05 school year, but then refused to accommodate any of
2
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her requests during the next two and a half years. In July 2006, the plaintiff filed a 
formal complaint with the Equal Opportunity Employment Counsel (“EEOC”) 
concerning the denial of her requests. Villanti alleges that, in response to this 
complaint and her previous requests for accommodation, her superiors gave her an 
increasingly heavy workload; gave her negative reviews; increased their supervision of 
her; and stymied her professional development
On January 31, 2008, the plaintiff filed the present lawsuit, naming five 
defendants:
• The Cold Spring Harbor School District;
• Thomas Dolan, the principal at the High School until June 30, 2006;
• Jay Matuk, the principal at the High School after June 30, 2006;
• Andrea Clouser, the Chairperson for the Science Department at the High 
School; and
• Joseph Monestaro, an Assistant Principal at the High School until 2006, 
who was charged with preparing the teaching schedule for the school.
Against all of these defendants, the plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1)
Under the ADA alleging discrimination and failure to accommodate, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101 etseq., (2) Under the ADA sounding in retaliation for protected acts, and (3)
violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, codified at New York Executive
Law §§ 290 et seq.
The defendants now move for summary judgment with respect to the first two 
causes of action, and request that the Court decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction over 
the third cause of action. The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff’s first cause of
3
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action on grounds, among other contentions, that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
that she has a “disability” under the relevant federal definition. With respect to the 
plaintiff’ s retaliation claim, the defendants seek dismissal primarily on the ground that 
none of the acts that the plaintiff complains of were sufficiently adverse to her to be 
retaliatory under the law.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
It is well-settled that summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) is proper 
only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is “material” within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 when its 
resolution “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). An 
issue is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In determining whether an issue is genuine, 
“[t]he inferences to be drawn from the underlying affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory 
answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.” Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.1995) 
(citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 
(1962) (per curiam), and Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d 
Cir. 1989)).
4
Case 2:08-cv-00434-ADS-ARL Document 50 Filed 08/20/10 Page 5 of 23 PagelD #: 1437
Once the moving party has met its burden, “the nonmoving party must come 
forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed.
2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). However, the nonmoving party cannot 
survive summary judgment by casting mere “metaphysical doubt” upon the evidence 
produced by the moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Summary judgment is 
appropriate when the moving party can show that “little or no evidence may be found in 
support of the nonmoving party’s case.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 
1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
B. As to the Plaintiff’s Claim for Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate
The plaintiff’s first cause of action is for discrimination and failure to 
accommodate. In this cause of action, the plaintiff essentially asserts that the 
defendants treated her unfairly because of her medical condition, and also failed to 
reasonably accommodate her medical needs in the workplace. As a prerequisite to a 
claim under either of these theories, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she had a 
“disability” as defined under the ADA. Conley v. United Parcel Serv., 88 F. Supp. 2d 
16, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Because the issue of the plaintiff’s alleged disability is 
dispositive in this case, the Court addresses only this factor with respect to the 
plaintiff’s first cause of action.
An individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA if she: “(A) [has] 
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; (B) [has] a record of such an impairment; or (C) [is]
5
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regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Colwell v. Suffolk 
County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 1998); Conley, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 18. Here, 
the plaintiff advances in her complaint and opposition papers only the theory that that 
she had a qualifying impairment. She does not assert that there was a record of her 
having such an impairment or that she was regarded as having a qualifying impairment. 
To the extent that the plaintiff appears to assert facts in her Rule 56.1 statement that go 
to a perception or record of impairment, the Court finds that the plaintiff has not raised 
triable issues of fact on these grounds.
1. Applicability of the 2008 Amendments to the ADA
On January 4, 2008, the United States Congress enacted the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), thereby modifying the standard by which courts assess 
whether a person has a disability under the ADA. Pub. L. 110-325. The ADAAA 
substantially broadened the definition of a “disability” under the law, and explicitly 
overturned the Supreme Court’s holdings in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 
119 S. Ct. 2139, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999) and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. 
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 185, 122 S. Ct. 681, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615 (2002), which had 
defined the statutory terms “substantially limits” and “major life activities” strictly. 
Although the ADAAA was passed on January 4, 2008, it did not take effect until 
January 1, 2009. Pub. L. 110-325, § 8.
The plaintiff now urges the Court to apply to this case the definition of 
“disability” as modified by the ADAAA, in spite of the fact that all of the relevant facts 
occurred prior to the effective date of the ADAAA. By contrast, the defendants assert
6
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that retroactive application of the ADAAA is inappropriate, and that the previous 
definition of “disability” is applicable.
While the Second Circuit has not yet addressed this issue in a published 
decision, it has held in multiple summary orders that the ADAAA does not apply 
retroactively. See, e.g., Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 08-cv-5367, 
2010 WL 2490966 at *1, n. 2 (2d Cir. June 21, 2010); Rogers v. City of N.Y., 359 F. 
App’x 201, 203, n. 1 (2d Cir. 2009). Moreover, other federal district and circuit courts 
have held almost universally that the ADAAA does not apply retroactively. See EEOC 
v. Agro Distrib., No. 07-60477, 2009 WL 95259, at *5 n. 8 (5th Cir. Jan. 15, 2009); 
Kiesewetter v. Caterpillar, Inc., 295 F. App’x 850, 851, (7th Cir. 2008); Casseus v. 
Verizon N.Y., Inc., No. 08-cv-4119, --- F.Supp.2d — , 2010 WL 2736935 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jul. 9, 2010); White v. Sears, No. 07-CV-4286, 2009 WL 1140434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 27, 2009); Moran v. Premier Educ. Group, LP, 599 F. Supp. 2d 263, 271-72 
(D.Conn. 2009). The Court finds these cases to be persuasive. The ADAAA contains 
no language indicating that it applies retroactively, and it would work an injustice on 
parties to be held liable for conduct that they would have reasonably believed at the 
time was in compliance with the law.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff urges that the Court apply the ADAAA retroactively 
based on the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Jenkins v. National Board of 
Medical Examiners, No. 08-5371, 2009 WL 331638, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009). 
However, the reasoning in Jenkins confirms, rather than impeaches, the Court’s present 
holding. The plaintiff in Jenkins filed a claim in 2008, before the ADAAA took effect,
7
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asserting that his diagnosed reading disorder was a disability under the ADA. Id. 
Based on this alleged disability, the plaintiff sought extra time to take a national 
medical exam. Id. However, the plaintiff asserted no claims for monetary damages or 
other retrospective relief. Id. In deciding Jenkins, the Sixth Circuit implicitly 
acknowledged the potential injustice that would come from awarding retrospective 
relief based on the amended definition of “disability”, but held that “[b]ecause Jenkins 
seeks prospective relief, no injustice would result from applying the amended law.” Id. 
(emphasis added).
In the Court’s view, the Sixth Circuit’s decision is entirely consistent with this 
Court’s determination not to apply the ADAAA to claims for money damages such as 
the plaintiff’ s. The Court therefore applies the definition of “disability” from the ADA 
as interpreted prior to the enactment of the ADAAA.
2. Application of the Disability Standard
Courts in the Second Circuit follow a three-step process to determine whether a 
person has a disability under the ADA. As such, a court analyzes: “(1) whether the 
plaintiff suffered from a physical or mental impairment, (2) whether the life activity 
upon which the plaintiff relied constitutes a major life activity under the ADA, and (3) 
whether the plaintiff’s impairment substantially limited the major life activity 
identified.” Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal 
quotations, citations, and alterations omitted) (citing Colwell, 158 F.3d at 201). The 
Court will now apply these rules to this case.
8
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Did the Plaintiff Have a Physical or Mental Impairment
The parties here agree that the plaintiff’s heart-related chest pains are a physical 
impairment. Thus, the Court need not address this issue further.
Did the Plaintiff’s Impairment Limit a Major Life Activity
In her complaint, the plaintiff states that her impairment limited the major life 
activity of working. In her opposition papers, she also contends that her condition 
affected her ability to “lift[], carry[], and exercise[e].” (Pl.’s Resp. at 8.) The Court 
therefore analyzes whether any of these four activities is a major life activity.
First, there is no doubt that working is a major life activity. The EEOC 
regulations interpreting the ADA, to which courts properly look for guidance, explicitly 
identify it as such. See Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 
2005) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)). Lifting and carrying are at least arguably major 
life activities, and the Court assumes without deciding that these activities are major 
life activities. See Colwell, 158 F.3d at 643. Similarly, though there is some doubt as 
to whether exercise is a major life activity, see id.; Johns-Davila v. City of New York, 
No. 99-cv-1885, 2000 WL 1725418, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2000) (collecting cases), 
the Court also assumes without deciding that it is a major life activity.
Did the Plaintiff’s Impairment Substantially Limit the Major Life Activities Identified 
The plaintiff provides two sources of evidence to describe the effects of her 
various conditions: three letters from her doctor, Richard H. Dyckman; and her own 
testimony. The Court addresses these sources in turn.
9
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The three letters from Dr. Dyckman, dated June 20, 2006, May 24, 2007, and
June 17, 2008, are not extensive. The first letter, addressed generically “To Whom It
May Concern,” states that Villanti developed “vasospastic angina” after a “myocardial
infarction” in 2004, and that she has had “mild flare-ups” since then. (Letter from Dr.
Richard Dyckman to Whom it May Concern (“Dyckman Letter I”), dated June 20,
2006.) The only conclusion that the letter states is that Villanti requires
“accommodations . . . in her work environment to minimize external stress.” (Id.) The
nature of these proposed accommodations is not discussed.
The second letter, dated almost a year later, May 24, 2007, and addressed to
defendant Andrea Clouser, an administrator at the High School, identifies Villanti’s
diagnosis as “recurrent stress-induced vasospastic angina with documented myocardial
injury,” and states that her condition:
requires that she be assigned to one classroom (to obviate the need 
for her to switch rooms multiple times each day), and that her 
classroom needs to be fully “set-up” for her assigned course work 
so that she will not have to transport textbooks and supplies to her 
room on a daily basis.
(Letter from Dr. Richard Dyckman to Andrea Clouser, dated June 20, 2006 (“Dyckman 
Letter II”) (emphasis in original).)
The third letter is dated one year after the second letter, June 17, 2008, and is 
addressed to the Deputy Superintendent of Cold Spring Harbor School District, Dr. 
Judith A. Wilansky. In that letter, Dr. Dyckman states that while Villanti’s “cardiac 
function has . . . largely normalized [since her heart attack in 2004], she continues to 
have episodes of stress-induced vasospastic angina.” (Letter from Dr. Richard
10
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Dyckman to Judith Wilansky, dated June 17, 2008 (“Dyckman Letter III”).) Dr. 
Dykman then states that:
[Villanti’s] condition appears to be exacerbated by stress in her 
work environment. Toward that end, I would very strongly 
recommend, if possible, that her classroom assignments be made 
with a view toward minimizing her need to switch rooms multiple 
times a day, and that if she needs to work in several different 
classrooms, that they be fully ‘set up’ so that she does not have to 
transport textbooks or supplies between rooms on a daily basis.
(Id.) Dr. Dykman concludes that “[i]f such reasonable accommodations are made, I
anticipate that she will be able to carry a full academic load.” (Id.)
Villanti also provides her own deposition testimony describing the limitations
that her condition imposes on her. In general, Villanti states that when she experiences
“stress”, “change[s] in the room temperature”, or when she is “exerting [herself]
physically”, she has intermittent chest pains, with “sometimes . . . a little numbness in
my left arm,” and “occasionally” shortness of breath. (Villanti Dep., dated May 19,
2009 (“Villanti Dep. II”) at 134:17-18, 135:4, 11-12.) Villanti affirms that because of
this, she doesn’t carry her son “often,” or ever carry “filled laundry baskets.” (Id. at
154:19, 145:18-19.)
Villanti further states that, as a result of her condition, she does “less 
cardiovascular exercise than [she] would like to.” (Id. at 119:9-10). Whereas before 
her heart attack she was a member of a gym, her exercise now amounts only to lifting 
ten pound weights twice a week, taking very short walks twice a week, and exercising 
on an elliptical machine—a low-impact substitute for a treadmill—twice a month.
11
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As for her work, Villanti maintains that she experiences chest pains if she 
teaches more than “three [or] four consecutive [forty-minute class] periods in a row 
without a break.” (Id. at 135:19-21.) Likewise, she experiences pain as a result of the 
stress of teaching “a different subject for three consecutive periods.” (Id. at 136:10­
11.) In addition, Villanti testified that she gets chest pains from moving items like 
“textbooks, . . . laboratory manuals, [and] . . . lab materials” between classrooms. 
(Villanti Dep., dated September 27, 2006 (“Villanti Dep. I”) at 8:22-23.)
The EEOC has promulgated regulations for courts to consider when 
determining whether a person is substantially limited in a particular major life activity. 
Under these regulations, “substantially limits” means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person 
in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration 
under which an individual can perform a particular major life 
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under 
which the average person in the general population can perform 
that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). Further, the regulations provide that, when determining 
whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity, courts should consider:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected 
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the 
impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). In determining whether a person is substantially limited in 
the major life activity of working, the EEOC has provided that:
12
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The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the 
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in 
various classes as compared to the average person having 
comparable training, skills and abilities.
The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute 
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(3)(i).
Generally, to survive summary judgment on the issue of whether a plaintiff’s 
condition substantially limits a major life activity, a plaintiff must not only (1) describe 
how those life activities are limited, but must also (2) support this description with 
competent medical evidence. See Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 32 F.3d 718, 722­
23 (2d Cir. 1994) (requiring medical evidence to show substantial limitation under the 
Rehabilitation Act’s parallel statutory requirements); Levy v. Hustedt Chevrolet, No. 
05-cv-4832, 2008 WL 5273927 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2008) (requiring medical 
evidence to sustain a claim under the ADA); Sussle v. Sirina Prot. Sys. Corp., 269 F. 
Supp. 2d 285, 301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same, collecting cases).
Here, the plaintiff’s medical evidence is insufficient to support her claim that 
she is substantially limited in working, lifting, carrying, or exercising. First, the letters 
do not describe the plaintiff’s condition in detail, nor do they explain in detail the basis 
for the accommodations requested in the letters. All three of Dr. Dyckman’s letters 
state that the plaintiff has “vasospastic angina,” but none explains the severity or result 
of this condition. Similarly, while some of the letters request specific accommodations, 
the only apparent basis for these accommodations is that the plaintiff should not be 
exposed to “stress.” (Dyckman Letter I (“accommodations need to be made in
13
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[Villanti’s] work environment to minimize external stress”); Dyckman Letter II 
(describing the plaintiff’ s condition as “stress-induced”); Dyckman Letter III 
(“[Villanti’s] condition appears to be exacerbated by stress”).)
Likewise, Dr. Dyckman’s descriptions of the accommodations Villanti requires 
at her work are either vague or contradictory. The June 2006 letter provides no 
description of the accommodations Villanti needs, except to say that Villanti should 
have her “external stress” minimized. (Dyckman Letter I.) Dr. Dyckman provides a 
much clearer and more emphatic mandate in his May 2007 letter: Villanti’s condition 
“requires that she be assigned to one classroom . . . .” (Dyckman Letter II (emphasis in 
original).) However, Dr. Dyckman does not explain clearly why this is necessary, and 
in his following letter he retreats from this position, stating that he “very strongly 
recommend[s], if possible” that Villanti be scheduled so as to “minimize her need to 
switch rooms multiple times a day.” (Dyckman Letter III.) This third letter then 
requests that Villanti not be required to move books or supplies between rooms, but 
also expressly admits of the possibility that Villanti might “work in several different 
classrooms.” (Id. (emphasis added).) Finally, Dr. Dyckman concludes that, “if such 
reasonable accommodations are made, I anticipate that [Villanti] will be able to carry a 
full academic load” (Id. (emphasis added).)
Considering this medical evidence in light of the direction provided by the 
EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA, the Court finds that it is insufficient to show 
that the plaintiff is substantially limited in her ability to work, lift, carry, or exercise. 
First, with respect to lifting, carrying, and exercising, Dr. Dykman’s letters provide
14
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virtually no information. While Dr. Dyckman’s latter two letters request that Villanti 
not “transport” books and supplies between classrooms, he makes no explicit mention 
of her ability to lift or carry items or to do other forms of exercise. With respect to 
working, Dr. Dyckman’s letters at most suggest that Villanti cannot work as a teacher if 
she must repeatedly move classrooms and transport materials. This does not support 
the conclusion that Villanti is restricted from performing either “a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in various classes,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(3)(i), as required to show a 
substantial limitation of the ability to work.
Even if medical evidence were not required to avoid summary judgment on this 
issue, the plaintiff’ s own description of her limitations is insufficient to establish that 
she is significantly restricted in any major life activity. First, the plaintiff’s testimony 
demonstrates her capacity to carry out the major life activities she identifies. The 
plaintiff states that, on a limited basis, she lifts weights, takes short walks, and exercises 
on an elliptical machine. She also states that she sometimes carries her son or light 
objects. Her ability to do this precludes her from being found to be substantially 
limited in lifting, carrying, or exercising. See id. at 640, 644 (holding that an inability 
to lift heavy objects and an inability to do some exercise are not substantial limitations 
of major life activities); Piascyk v. City of New Haven, 64 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29-30 
(D.Conn. 1999) (holding that an inability to lift heavy objects was not a substantial 
limitation of a major life activity, and collecting cases).
As for the plaintiff’s testimony with regard to her limitations on her ability to 
work, the Court has already noted that applicable EEOC regulations explicitly provide
15
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that “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial 
limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(3)(i). Here, even 
if the plaintiff had testified that she is unable to perform her current job—a conclusion 
about which the Court has some doubt—she has not offered any testimony indicating 
that she could not perform another comparable job in her field. See Colwell, 158 F.3d 
at 645 (granting defendant employer judgment as a matter of law on disability issue, 
and holding that “[w]ithout specific evidence about ‘the kinds of jobs from which [an] 
impaired individual is disqualified,’ the jury could not perform the careful analysis that 
is necessary to determine that [the plaintiff] was substantially limited in his ability to 
work,” citing Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 723 (2d Cir.1994)). To the 
extent that the plaintiff asserts that she cannot perform jobs that are stressful, this 
category is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the ADA. See id. at 645 (holding 
that there was no substantial limitation of the ability to work when plaintiff presented 
evidence that his doctor instructed him to “avoid stress”).
Therefore, the Court finds that the plaintiff cannot meet her burden of showing 
that she has a disability as defined under the ADA. As such, the plaintiff cannot sustain 
a claim either for discrimination or failure to accommodate, and the Court grants the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for 
discrimination and failure to accommodate.
C. As to the Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim
The plaintiff separately asserts a claim against the defendants for retaliating 
against her for complaining about the defendants’ alleged discrimination and failure to
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accommodate. To assert this claim under the ADA, the plaintiff need not show that she 
was disabled under the meaning of the ADA. Rather, she must only “possess[] a good 
faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated 
[the] law.” Treglia v. Town of Manlius 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
Here, the defendants do not challenge the plaintiff’s good faith belief, and the Court’s 
finding that the plaintiff was not disabled under the provisions of the statute does not 
preclude the plaintiff from advancing a retaliation claim.
To analyze a claim for retaliation, the Court employs the familiar McDonnell- 
Douglas burden shifting test, as modified for the retaliation context. Reg’l Econ. Cmty. 
Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 54 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, in 
the first step of the process, the plaintiff must show that she “[1] was engaged in 
protected activity, [2] that the defendant was aware of this activity, [3] that the 
defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and [4] a causal connection exists 
between the protected activity and the adverse action, i.e., that a retaliatory motive 
played a part in the adverse employment action.” Id. (internal quotations, citations, and 
alterations omitted). If the plaintiff thus succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the defendants must then produce a non-discriminatory reason for the 
complained-of conduct. Id. Upon the production of this reason, the plaintiff then must 
meet her ultimate burden of showing that the defendants’ acts were retaliatory. Id.
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1. The Prima Facie Case
The parties here agree that the plaintiff has satisfied the first two prongs of the 
prima facie case required by the McDonnell-Douglas test. The plaintiff made 
numerous requests for accommodations and filed a formal complaint with EEOC with 
regard to the denial of these requests. Making these requests and filing this complaint 
was protected activity, satisfying the first prong of the prima facie case. See Treglia, 
313 at 720; Weixel v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 149 
(2d Cir. 2002) (citing Muller v. Costello, 187 F.2d 298, 311 (2d Cir. 1999)). The 
parties also agree that the defendants were aware of this activity, thus satisfying the 
second prong. However, the parties vigorously contest whether the plaintiff has 
satisfied the third prong of the prima face case, which requires that the plaintiff show 
that the defendants took adverse action against her.
In the retaliation context, an “adverse action” is an action that “well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 
Alam v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 07-cv-3540, 2009 WL 3096293 at *12 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2009) (quoting Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006)). Here, the plaintiff 
has asserted that the defendants took numerous retaliatory actions against her, most of 
which the Court views as unsupported or insubstantial. However, the Court is satisfied 
that there are genuine issues of fact with respect to at least one alleged retaliatory act: 
whether the defendants unfairly increased the burden of the plaintiff’ s teaching
18
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schedule between the 2005-2006 and the 2006-2007 school years. As such, summary 
judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s retaliation claim is not appropriate.
The parties agree that during the 2005-2006 school year, Villanti taught only 
two different classes, and taught in just one classroom. Then, for the 2006-2007 school 
year, Villanti was additionally scheduled to teach three different subjects rather than 
two, and to teach in two different classrooms rather than one. The plaintiff further 
asserts that she was scheduled to teach more periods in a row in 2006-2007 compared 
to the previous year, though the defendants dispute this.
These scheduling changes are not dramatic, and, in fact, the plaintiff’s contract 
provided that she was obligated to take on the additional burdens assigned to her. 
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has stated that changing an employee’s 
working conditions may be a retaliatory action even when the employee is contractually 
obligated to perform under the increased burden. See Burlington-Northern, 548 U.S. at 
69 (citing Washington v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
In Burlington-Northern, and more explicitly in the Seventh Circuit cases that stem from 
Washington, courts have held that a change in working conditions within an 
employee’s ordinary obligations can be retaliatory when it takes advantage of a “unique 
vulnerability” that the employee faces. Thomas v. Potter, 202 Fed. App’x 118, 119 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (citing Washington, 420 F.3d at 662-63); see also Ragusa, 2010 WL 
2490966 at *3 (holding that the “added challenged” of an increased teaching schedule 
could be a retaliatory action).
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Here, while the Court has found as a matter of law that Villanti was not disabled 
under the terms of the statute, Villanti nevertheless expressed to the defendants that she 
experienced pain when put under additional stress and when called on to physically 
exert herself. In the Court’s view, there is at least an issue of fact as to whether this is a 
“unique vulnerability” that the defendants took advantage of when preparing the 
plaintiff’s teaching schedule. Similarly, the Court finds that the additions to the 
plaintiff’ s obligations between 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 are sufficient to raise genuine 
issues of fact as to whether they were burdensome enough so as to discourage a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s condition from pursuing a discrimination complaint.
As for the fourth prong of the prima facie case, causation, the Court is satisfied 
that the temporal proximity between the plaintiff’s protected activity and the alleged 
retaliatory acts raises a genuine issue of fact as to the causal connection between the 
protected activity and the alleged retaliation. There is credible evidence that the 
plaintiff requested certain accommodations in May 2006, and received her class 
schedule on the last day of school in June 2006. Under Second Circuit law, this is 
sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the defendants changed the plaintiff’s 
teaching schedule in retaliation for her protected activity. See Gorman-Bakos v.
Cornell Co-op Ext’n of Schenectady Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 554-55 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(collecting cases).
2. The Non-Discriminatory Reason for the Allegedly Retaliatory Conduct
In the second step of the burden-shifting test, the defendants must state a non­
discriminatory reason for the alleged retaliatory conduct. Here, the defendants
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essentially assert that the plaintiff’ s teaching schedule was prepared pursuant to the 
school’s ordinary practices, and any increase in her teaching burden was incidental to 
the needs of the school. This response satisfies the defendants’ burden of production.
3. The Plaintiff’s Ultimate Burden of Proof
Once the first two steps of the burden-shifting test have been satisfied, “the 
McDonnell Douglas framework disappears,” Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program v.
City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal citations and aleterations 
omitted), and “[t]he plaintiff must then produce evidence and carry the burden of 
persuasion that the proffered reason [for the allegedly retaliatory conduct] is a pretext.” 
Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006). The plaintiff may do 
this by presenting additional evidence, or by relying on the evidence that supported the 
plaintiff’ s prima facie case. Sista, 445 F.3d at 173 (quoting Heyman v. Queens Vill. 
Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, Inc., 198 F.3d 68,
72 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Here, the Court is satisfied that the evidence that supported the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case also raises genuine issues of fact as to whether the defendants’ explanation 
for the plaintiff’s change in schedule was pretextual. To be sure, the defendants offer 
voluminous evidence explaining the non-discriminatory reasons for the schedule that 
the defendants prepared. If this testimony is credited by a jury, it may preclude the 
plaintiff’ s retaliation claim. However, at the present procedural stage, the Court takes 
all evidence in the best light for the plaintiff. In doing so, the Court finds that the 
plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to allow her to proceed to trial on her
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retaliation claim. Therefore, except as described directly below, the Court denies the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’ s retaliation 
claim under the ADA.
4. Claims Against Individual Defendants
The plaintiff asserts her ADA retaliation claim against four natural persons.
The Second Circuit has recently held that the ADA does not provide for individual 
liability for retaliation, Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2010), and 
therefore the plaintiff’s claim for retaliation asserted against these individual defendants 
must be dismissed. To the extent that the plaintiff asserts a retaliation claim against the 
individual defendants in their official capacities, this claims is duplicative of the 
plaintiff’ s retaliation claim against the Cold Spring Harbor School District, and also is 
dismissed. See, e.g., Tsotesi v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 336, 338 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003).
D. As to the Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
The defendants request that the Court decline to exercise its supplementary 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to New York’s Human Rights 
Law, on grounds that the plaintiff can sustain no valid federal claims. As the Court 
finds that the plaintiff has established genuine issues of material fact with respect to her 
retaliation claim under the ADA, the defendants’ request is without basis. Therefore, 
the Court continues to exercise its supplementary jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state 
law claims, and the defendants’ motion in this regard is denied.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to 
the plaintiff’s discrimination and failure to accommodate claim under the ADA is 
granted, and this claim is dismissed as to all defendants; and it is further
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to 
the plaintiff’ s retaliation claim under the ADA against Thomas Dolan, Jay Matuk, 
Andrea Clouser, and Joseph Monestaro is granted, and this claim is dismissed; and it is 
further
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to 
the plaintiff’ s retaliation claim under the ADA against Cold Spring Harbor School 
District is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for the Court to decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’ s state law claims is denied; and it is further 
ORDERED that the parties are directed to appear before the Court for a pre­
trial conference on Monday, September 13, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York 
August 20, 2010
/s/ Arthur D. Spatt_______
ARTHUR D. SPATT 
United States District Judge
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